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SELF-LOVE AND FORGIVENESS:
A Holy Alliance?
Patrick McKinley Brennan1

“Love is a binding force, by which another is
joined to me and cherished as myself.”
-- St. Thomas Aquinas2

I. Introduction: Offense and Forgiveness

Victor and Otto are casual acquaintances. Having recently grown envious of
Victor on account of his comparative success, Otto takes advantage of an opportunity to
knock Victor off his bicycle. “Take that,” says Otto as he casts down Victor from his
bike. The physical harm to Victor is real but not too serious, a few cuts and scrapes that
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John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies and Professor of Law, Villanova University School of
Law. An invitation from Darlene Weaver to contribute a paper on “forgiveness and the law” at the
conference “Forgiveness,” sponsored by the Theological Institute at Villanova University, provided a
welcome opportunity to pursue the topics and themes of this paper. I was able to pursue them further
thanks to an invitation to present a public lecture on a topic in law and morality at Texas Lutheran
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don’t amount to much. Insult, though -- Victor feels the sting and shame of insult, and he
grows angry. Meanwhile, Otto, the offender, neither feels nor feigns one whit of
contrition. Otto remains intransigently unrepentant, and he credibly manifests as much to
Victor, his victim.
There’s a lot going on even in this constructed mini-universe. If Otto had
knocked Victor from his bike on account of his (Otto’s) suffering an epileptic seizure,
Victor’s cuts and scrapes would be the same, but he (Victor) would feel differently.
Victor’s “moral emotions,” as they are sometimes called, would be different. Or, more to
the point, we can all agree that they should be different. A random rock’s falling and
scraping me, an epileptic’s seizing and thereby harming me – these are occurrences.3
Whatever Victor’s suffering on account of these occurrences, most people will readily
agree, I think, that it would be silly or pathetic (though not, I suppose, unthinkable) for
Victor to resent or be angry at the fallen rock or the (formerly) seized epileptic. These
are “acts of nature,” and there is wide agreement that these do not properly evoke the
moral emotions of hatred or resentment.
But can we not also agree that it is appropriate and reasonable for Victor to grow
angry under the circumstances I have sketched? I think the answer is yes. Otto has
committed (what I shall call) an offense, that is, an injustice, against Victor, and it is right
and proper to bridle at injustice, to grow angry at it, perhaps especially when it is
perpetrated against oneself. It is not evil but good, according to Thomas Aquinas, to be
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The classic statement of what is an act “of the person” is Aquinas’s in the Prologue to I-II of the Summa
theologiae. Our criminal law incorporates this moral judgment. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, “Involuntary Acts
and Criminal Liability,” 51 Ethics 332 (1971).
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“angry” at injustice.4 Otto’s treatment of Victor could be far worse, of course; not all
offenses are created equal, and in my example the offense is comparatively slight. But I
take such an example in order to highlight that it is a morally significant fact that Victor
has suffered an injustice, and it is reasonable for Victor’s passions to be aroused on
account of the injustice.
Victor, however, if he is like the rest of us, is angry not just at the offense, but at
Otto, the offender. Appreciating -- brooding over the fact -- that the injustice was Otto’s
choice, Victor resents not just the injustice but its willful perpetrator. In all likelihood, in
fact, it is Otto, not the offense, who becomes the focus of Victor’s passion. What should
Victor do now?
Here we may no longer be able to agree. My contention is this: Victor should
forgive Otto without precondition, while continuing to hate the injustice. The anger that
has been aroused by the offense must yield to a refusal to fold Otto, the offender, into his
offense, the injustice he has committed. Victor may – indeed, he should -- hate the
injustice, but he may not hate Otto. Unconditional forgiveness no matter what -- this is
the thesis I shall defend here. 5 It refuses to reduce a person to the injustice he has
elected, and it liberates the offended to get on with this moral life. As Aquinas says, it is
wrong “to be angry against a brother,”6 though it is commendable to be angry at his
offense.
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Aquinas, De Malo, 12.1 ad 1 (“the anger which is directed against sin is good”). As Thomas sees it, our
moral emotions or “passions” are not to be suppressed but, rather, conformed to correct judgments of good
and evil. See Jean Porter, “The Unity of the Virtues and the Ambiguity of Goodness: A Reappraisal of
Aquinas’s Theory of the Virtues,” 21 Journal of Religious Ethics, 137, 150-51 (1995).
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This would make me a “pure gracer” in the terms of the debate. See Timothy P. Jackson, The Priority of
Love: Christian Charity and Social Justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 137-38. Jackson
canvasses and answers many of the important objections to the “pure gracer” position.
6
Aquinas, De malo, 12.1 resp.
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My informed guess is that this thesis will seem as congenial to a few as it will
seem quixotic or dangerous to the great number of others. Many people would counsel
Victor to be cautious about forgiving Otto, encouraging Victor to show himself a healthy
dose of self-respect by not being too quick to forgive. Others would even advise Victor
to require an apology from Otto before forgiving him.
If we start from the account of the human person developed by Aquinas, though,
we cannot but conclude, I think, that forgiveness, which I have yet to define, must be
given unconditionally. My aim in this paper is to lay out, contextualize, and defend
against various challenges, as space allows, the account of interpersonal forgiveness that
one can piece together in Aquinas, which starts as a properly philosophical, not a
theological, account. The recent revival of interest in Aquinas’s thought in contemporary
discussions of “natural law” and virtue theory provides a ready context for asking what
Aquinas can tell us about human forgiveness, a topic of increasing interest to Anglophone
philosophers especially since Aurel Kolnai’s 1973 article “Forgiveness.”7 As far as my
answer goes, the bottom line is that for someone holding a teleological understanding of
the human person such as Aquinas’s, forgiveness is not just about the “moral emotions”
that injustice (properly) excites. These are real and important, but not dispositive: There
is also the question of virtue and happiness. Victor’s anger at Otto is a fact; his virtue
and happiness are a possibility.8 “For St. Thomas, in the mainstream tradition of
Aristotle and the Fathers of the Church, the question of happiness is incontestably the
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first consideration in Christian moral theory. It is natural to everyone. . . . It expresses
the fundamental human thrust toward the true and the good.”9
As I understand Thomas’s account, forgiveness of others should follow from the
love of self that a person is by nature inclined to have, a love that works itself out in a life
of the natural virtues and happiness. “Well-ordered self-love is right and natural,”10
according to Aquinas, and forgiveness, I shall argue, is the form natural love takes in one
who has been offended, as he returns from anger to temperance. This is a requirement of
natural human happiness, as Thomas sees it. But there is more. For someone agreeing
with Aquinas that our natural moral life is always already more than meets the eye or the
measurements of the physicist, the bottom line also reflects the consequences of (what
has been called) an “anthropology of grace:”11 the person’s gratuitous granting of
forgiveness is possible because of our graced human participation in the divine life of
love, our true happiness. The supernatural virtue of love given by God to man through
grace, according to Thomas, gives natural love and all the other natural virtues their form.

II. Situating Forgiveness

Stepping back for a moment, the account of the human person that interests me
here is Aquinas’s, but note well a point that seems often to be absent from philosophical
and other discussions of forgiveness: Regardless of the account of the human person one
adopts (Aristotle’s or Hobbes’s or Aquinas’s – it matters not for my immediate point),
9

Servais Pinckaers, O.P., The Sources of Christian Ethics (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of
America Press, 1995), 6.
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Summa theologiae, I-II 77.4 ad 1.
11
Thomas P. O’Meara, O.P., “Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas,” 58 Theological Studies 256,
269 (1997).
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forgiveness is not a free-floating or foundational concept. A conception of the human
person must inform any potentially promising theory of forgiveness. Just as it would
make no sense to speculate about forgiving without regard to whether it is a person or
chimera we have in mind as the potential forgiver, so, too, in giving an account of
forgiveness we must have in mind a particular account of the persons who might – or
might not -- do the forgiving. “Dogs don’t forgive, because dogs don’t resent.
Forgiveness is unique to rational beings, and is a gift of metaphysical freedom. Only the
accountable being, able to take responsibility for his own actions and mental states, can
forgive or be forgiven . . . .”12 On the account of the human person I have in mind here,
Aquinas’s, the human person is called and enabled to be a lover -- of self, of others, and
of God, and forgiveness just is, as I have already asserted, the form that human love takes
when one has been offended by a fellow human being.
My first introduction to the scholarly treatment of forgiveness many years ago
was through the work of my then-colleague Jeffrie G. Murphy, one of the foremost
philosophers of punishment of our generation. I note this autobiographical point because,
as those familiar with Murphy’s work can appreciate, the man is not profligate with
forgiveness. In the preface to one of his more recent books, Murphy reports the
following about his earlier book Forgiveness and Mercy: “a colleague . . . asked me if
the subtitle of the book was going to be ‘An Outsider’s View.”’13 Even as he has come
around to a wider embrace of forgiveness, Murphy has continued to do us all the service
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Roger Scruton, “‘What is forgiveness?’, Review of Charles Griswold, Forgiveness: A Philosophical
Exploration,” Times Literary Supplement, Dec. 12 2007 (Timesonline version).
13
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Getting Even: Forgiveness and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003),
viii.
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of pressing us to think hard about whether we should not be cautious about how we
ourselves forgive or recommend that others forgive.
Still, with Murphy’s and others’ important cautions in mind, I would like to argue
here that forgiveness is to be given as freely as possible by one who has been offended.
This unconditional demand for love in the form of forgiveness in response to offense will
come as a subversive message in a culture in which most people are Kantians14, either by
profession (Murphy) or osmosis (most of the rest). Recall that the Kantian fears love
itself as a heteronomous influence, a potentially corrupting influence on duty for duty’s
sake. In a related vein, the demand for unconditional forgiveness will also arouse
suspicion in a culture such as ours in which those who are moral relativists in private
demand total justice in public.15 And then there are those many individuals who, not
quite sure whether God remains in charge, undertake the divine work of holding
themselves and the world together by sheer force of will. Murphy references “the clinchfisted anger with which I try to sustain my self-respect and hold my world together all
alone.”16 Self-creation is hard work,17 and forgiveness seems an unlikely ally to the task.
The worry that forgiveness will be our undoing is powerful and pervasive. What I
shall argue, though, is that, ironically enough, forgiveness is the true way to “hold oneself
together,” so to speak. This is in part because, as I have already suggested and will argue
14

“The Kantian view or something closely akin to it seems clearly to be the way many people think about
morality even today, particularly those raised in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Kant often says what they
themselves would say about their own moral life, were they to articulate it.” Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel
Kant’s Moral Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), xiii. “We are all Kantians now.”
A.H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), 2.
15
“Modern legal culture insists on a single, unified domain of fairness and legality and demands a single
standard of justice. To satisfy this demand, every institution has to fall into line.” Lawrence Friedman,
Total Justice (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1985) 91.
16
He does so in the context of observing how “faith” can alleviate this posture. Murphy, 92.
17
See Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Place of ‘Higher Law’ in the Quotidian Practice of Law: Herein of
Practical Reason, Natural Law, Natural Rights, and Sex Toys, __ Georgetown Journal of Law and Public
Policy __ (forthcoming 2009).
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at length, forgiveness begins in a self-affirming act, the self-love that supplants the selfimmolation that is involved in nursing an offense. Love of self, properly conceived, is
what is most needful on the part of the victim – or so I shall argue; and self-love is the
beginning, though by no means the fullness, of forgiveness. Perhaps this will be
welcome news to those who regard self-respect and forgiveness as set in essential
tension.
But what of the lingering injustice of the offense? The human desire for
satisfaction in the name of justice does, and should, run strong. Satisfaction is not,
however, on my understanding, a condition of or ingredient in forgiveness, though it may
yet be a condition of reconciliation, which is a separate question. Indeed, as I have
already suggested, forgiveness just is the way of acknowledging the injustice while
getting on with the moral life – the demands of love -- by not insisting upon justice here
and now. Satisfaction may indeed be the term of a negotiated reconciliation; it may
indeed be the work of the state in appropriate cases (as to which, more below); and many
believers do indeed anticipate satisfaction in an eschatological rectification. But
terrestrial justice, quite apart from the fact that it is not any one individual’s to exact, is a
contingent and utterly elusive affair, and who can wisely postpone his living, his loving
until he shall have received his due?
Before developing my thesis in more detail, a brief aside is in order. One of the
areas in which the nature and possibility of forgiveness are much mooted is the law,
especially the criminal (as opposed to the civil) law. For reasons that should already
begin to be apparent, if forgiveness is the form love takes in the offended, it follows that
forgiveness has no place whatsoever in the operation of the criminal law. The denial that
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forgiveness has a place in the functioning of a criminal law system follows from the
claims, which I am defending, first, that forgiveness is a work of love by one who has
been offended and, second, that love, whatever else is true of it, never is, even in the form
of forgiveness, an act that someone else can perform on behalf of the one who is called to
love. For reasons I shall develop, love is an irreducibly personal act, and in a culture
where we are tempted to outsource everything (including procreation), it turns out to be
especially important not to lose sight of the intuitively obvious point that only persons
can love. Whatever good the state can perform, it is not what we call love.18 Love is
ours to do, not law’s.
Related to this first aside is a second. As I mentioned, satisfaction – justice – may
be a condition of the offended’s and the offender’s becoming reconciled to each other,
but I need not settle the matter, as I am arguing that forgiveness is distinct from
reconciliation and not dependent upon it. Catholic theology, including Aquinas’s,
teaches that God makes the justice of satisfaction a condition of sacramental forgiveness,
but denies that humans are empowered to impose that condition on their equals who need
to be forgiven.19 In insisting upon personal forgiveness of offenders, however, I do not
suggest – indeed, for reasons I cannot develop here, I deny -- that a robust ethic of loving
forgiveness rules out the possibility of just punishment, by the state, of the offender.
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“Love—caritas—will always prove necessary, even in the most just society. There is no ordering of the
State so just that it can eliminate the need for a service of love. Whoever wants to eliminate love is
preparing to eliminate man as such. There will always be suffering which cries out for consolation and
help. There will always be loneliness. There will always be situations of material need where help in the
form of concrete love of neighbor is indispensable. . . . The State which would provide everything,
absorbing everything into itself, would ultimately become a mere bureaucracy incapable of guaranteeing
the very thing which the suffering person—every person—needs: namely, loving personal concern. We do
not need a State which regulates and controls everything . . . .” Pope Benedict XVI, encyclical letter Deus
caritas est, no. 28b (2005).
19
Erik Luitjen, Sacramental Forgiveness as a Gift of God: Thomas Aquinas on the Sacrament of Penance
(Leuven: Peters, 2003), 44.
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Forgiveness does not dilute justice. The justice of proportionate retributive punishment
may even be, as Simon Weil believed, “a need of the soul”20 that has received or even
experienced forgiveness, or yet hopes for it.
Related to this is the fact that, further, although loving is not something a legal
system can do, a properly designed and implemented system of criminal law can perhaps
contribute to identifying when forgiveness might be called for, and, thereby, to reducing
the frequency with which love must take the form of forgiveness. It would do this by
condemning and promising punishment for, and thus deterring, immoral conduct. It is
better not to have to hope for forgiveness; better also to live in a world in which
forgiveness is freely offered; and sublime to be the person who overcomes offense with
love in the form of forgiveness.

III. Locating Forgiveness: Nature and Supernature

Or is it? Jeffrie Murphy is fond of quoting S.J. Perlelman: “To err is human, to
forgive supine.”21 That might well be true of the false forgiveness that is a form of
condonation of wrongdoing or a manifestation of servile self-loathing by the offended.
But, for reasons I have already indicated and to which I am coming in detail, forgiveness
that is a true work of love cannot but rise to the level of the divine. If rise it does, though,
thanks to grace, it also remains an irreducibly human and personal act. I concur in the
judgment of Lord Edward Herbert: “Forgiveness is the most necessary and proper work

20
21

Quoted in Jackson, 139.
Murphy, 14.
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of every man; for, though, when I do not a just thing, or a charitable, or a wise, another
man may do it for me, yet no man can forgive my enemy but myself.”22
That Lord Herbert is right about forgiveness is not self-evident. The trouble
besetting Lewis Carroll’s intrepid hunters of the Snark was that all they had to go on was
the word-sound “Snark;” it was an existent about which they had no clues. We need not
be similarly clueless. Forgiveness is the word-sound currently on the table, and we can
approach it by observing the broad agreement that forgiveness is different from
forgetting, which is not a moral response at all; excusing, which is “discounting what is
bad;”23 condoning, which is approving of what is bad;24 or pardoning, which is remitting
a penalty in some kind of official (not personal) capacity.25
The observation of these differences amounts to considerable progress, but it still
leaves many questions unanswered. For example, is forgiveness the overcoming of
revenge, as Bishop Butler famously preached? Or is forgiveness “the overcoming of
resentment for moral reasons,”26 as Jeffrie Murphy claims, intentionally modifying
Bishop Butler’s position? Or is forgiveness, instead, as Joanna North maintains, “a
conscious attempt to improve oneself in relation to the wrongdoer?”27 Or is forgiveness,

22

Quoted in J. Harvey, “Forgiving as an Obligation of the Moral Life,” 8 International Journal of Moral
and Social Studies, 211, 221 (1993). Josef Pieper is in accord: “[W]e can forgive . . . only something that
has been done to ourselves.” Josef Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), 189.
23
Pieper, 188. “By ‘excusing’ we mean discounting what is bad. We ‘let it be’ although it is bad; we
ignore the evil; we don’t care; we are indifferent to it; we don’t worry about it. Now there is very little that
a lover should ‘excuse’ in the above sense – whereas he can forgive the beloved everything.” Id. at 189
24
R.S. Downie, “Forgiveness,” 15 The Philosophical Quarterly 128, 130 (1965).
25
Id. at 131-33
26
Jeffrie G. Murphy, “Forgiveness and Resentment,” in Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton,
Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 14, 23-24. Murphy later
expanded his account to understand forgiveness of overcoming other negative moral emotions or feelings
(such as “anger, hatred, loathing, contempt, indifference, disappointment, or even sadness”) for moral
reasons. Murphy, Getting Even, 59.
27
Joanna North, “Wrongdoing and Forgiveness,” 62 Philosophy, 499 and 506 (1987)
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as R.S. Downie argued, a form of agape that is equivalent to respect of persons?28 Or is
forgiveness, as Charles Griswold has argued at length in his recent book Forgiveness: A
Philosophical Exploration (2007), “to understand, to relinquish revenge and resentment,
all the while holding the offender responsible,” by (in part) requiring the offender to
satisfy certain baseline conditions?29
It seems to me there are important elements of truth in each of these several
definitions/descriptions, to some of which I shall return below. Unlike the account of
forgiveness I have begun to sketch, however, they all, in their various ways, start from an
overall picture of the moral life that is impoverished, above all because they slight the
place of love or, as it is sometimes called, charity. “Love” is a term that has become
degraded in our culture30, and “charity” conjures images of grudging social work.
Caution and care are in order, therefore, when love or charity is at issue, lest we
inadvertently cheapen the central Christian claim: “God is love.” (I John 4:8).
It is because God is love that true human love is, in the Christian profession of
faith, nothing less than “a participation in the very life of God and, as such, the
foundation of all virtues for those made in the Image of God.”31 Having been loved first,
we are both called and empowered to love. Having been forgiven first, “when we were
still sinners” (Romans 5:8), our love must sometimes be of those who injure us, in which
case we call it forgiveness. Christ summed this up at the Last Supper: “Love one another
28

R.S. Downie, “Forgiveness,” 15 The Philosophical Quarterly 128, 134 (1965): “The principle of
respect for persons is the objective correlative of that which as a matter of practical concern emerges as
agape. It is the fact that respect for persons and agape are merely two sides of the same thing that gives
forgiveness its high place in Christian as well as in secular morality.”
29
Charles Griswold, Forgiveness: A Philosophical Explanation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007), 47.
30
E.g., Barbara Atwell, “The Jurisprudence of Love,” 85 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 495, 501 (“the most
powerful energy we have is love”).
31
Jackson, 14. According to Aquinas, “Love is the form, mover, and root of the virtues.” Disputatio de
caritate 13.
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as I have loved you.” (John 13:34-35) To anticipate an objection, here is Aquinas’s
answer: “If we compare loving our friends and loving our enemies, then the first is better
as regards its object or term; but as regards the principle, which is the will, then there is
the more merit where there is the greater effort.”32 This effort will have a beginning in
our created nature, but it is completed by God-given grace, which is the principle and
root of all the supernatural virtues,33 including charity.
But is love as I intend it here, then, solely the province of Christians? What is
there for non-Christians in my account of love (and therefore forgiveness)? I have
distinguished already between the natural and the supernatural, but if we distinguish this
way, as Catholic theology does, we do so in order to reunite. Beginning from a
phenomenology of the moral life on the natural level, of teleology of the sort familiar
since Aristotle, we will be in position to proceed to an account of moral life on the
supernatural level, where grace builds on, and does not destroy, nature. “How love is
understood follows from how human nature is understood.”34 And the reverse is also
true, even without the admixture of the supernatural. How could it be otherwise? My
argument here depends, then, upon there being such a thing as human nature and the
properties I shall impute to it as I go along. It also depends upon human nature’s being
not only created, but also graced, that is, raised into a supernatural economy of happiness
and participation in the life of God who is love. What I shall argue is that human nature,
and especially graced human nature, calls for love, including by the offended.35 What I

32

Aquinas, XXX Commentary on the Sentences i.3.
Summa theologiae, I-II 110.3 ad 3.
34
Pieper, 209.
35
In putting this as I do, I do not suggest that there was ever a time of pure nature (without grace), only
that the graced nature that in fact exists is capable of what nature without grace would not have been
capable of (if such a counterfactual had obtained).
33
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argue, further, is that grace makes that love possible, even by the offended. “Forgiveness
is one of the fundamental acts of love,”36 which itself begins, as I have already said, in
the natural love of self, which the Christian believes is perfected through the grace of
charity.

IV. The Analogies of Love

Human persons do not realize the potential of their created nature
“automatically,” as it were. Unlike plants and brute beasts, they must freely choose and
will it.37 Jacques Maritain captures this central insight of the Thomistic tradition as
follows: “According to a commonplace expression, which is a very profound one, man
must become what he is. In the moral order, he must win, by himself, his freedom and
his personality.”38 This process, of winning oneself by becoming in act what one is in
potency, has a temporal beginning for every person who attains the use of rationality. In
the context of determining whether before children have the use of reason it can be said
that there is in them either venial or mortal sin, Thomas observes that when the child
“begins to have the use of reason, he is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or
mortal sin.” Thomas continues immediately to the crucial point: “Now the first thing
that occurs to a person to think about at that time, is to deliberate about himself.”39 The

36

Pieper, 189.
The rest of creation enjoys only a passive participation in the divine governance of creation. Rational
creatures also enjoy an active participation by way of will and intelligence. See Steven Long, “Natural Law
or Autonomous Practical Reason: Problems for the New Natural Law Theory,” in John Goyette et al.,
Thomas Aquinas and the Natural Law Tradition (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press,
2004), 165-93.
38
Jacques Maritain, Scholasticism and Politics (New York: Bles, 1954), 52.
39
“Sed primum quod tunc homini cogitandum occurrit, est deliberare de seipso.”
37
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person thinks first of himself, not of others, not even of God – and, mirabile auditu, this
is as it ought to be!
This is because what he must do, Thomas explains, is “to direct himself to his due
end.”40 The human person is not merely the location of a mechanistically determined
outcome – he is existentially free to bring himself into ever fuller being and freedom,
free, that is, to realize his given purpose or “due end.” Commenting on this important
passage, Maritain says the following: This act, “the first act of freedom,” is, “in a moral
sense, an absolute beginning.”41 It is “a moral act par excellence.”42 In this “primal act
of freedom,” he continues, the child

takes himself in hand; he frees or delivers his own self from the deterministic
crust under which he had lived until that moment; he ushers himself into the
universe of moral life by freely deciding about the direction of his life. At the
root of such act there is a reflection upon oneself which takes place in the intellect
and answers the question: “What do you live for?”43

“What do you live for?” Stated in the philosophical terms of which the child is not yet
capable, the answer is: his good, that is, his last end.
Stated differently, in terms perhaps closer to those of the child’s inchoate
understanding, the answer is: happiness, beatitudo or felicitas. It is Thomas’s view,
which seems obviously correct, that we do all that we do for the sake of happiness:
40

“Seipsum ordinaverit ad debitum finem.”
Jacques Maritain, The Range of Reason (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1942), 66.
42
Jacques Maritain, Moral Philosophy:An historical and critical survey of the great systems (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964), 141.
43
Maritain, The Range of Reason, 66
41
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“Happiness is the greatest human good, the end to which all others are subordinate.”44
Make no mistake: We are frequently mistaken about what will make us happy.
Everything we seek, however, we seek under the aspect of the good, that is, because we
think it will make us happy.
Why do we, each one of us, inexorably seek our own happiness? The Thomist’s
answer is this: “Every natural being . . . possesses a determinate nature, and in accord
with this nature a determinate, innate drive or striving for its own perfection.”45 Living
as we do several centuries into the almost pathological effort to banish teleology from the
organic and inorganic world, this can come as a surprise. But not everyone has acceded
to the arguments that we can relinquish teleological explanation46, and, on the Thomist’s
teleological understanding of the universe, each created being possesses appetite, an inner
tendency or inclination that moves it toward its proper perfection. “This for Thomas is
one of the marvels of creation: that God did not create beings which would be moved
only with external causes, but rather endowed beings with their own interior principles of
action.”47
Amor is Thomas’s name for the inner source of things’ inclinations toward their
respective ends. Love is always a transitive affair48, and proper love, according to
Aquinas, depends upon a proper proportion between the lover and the loved object.
Things, both animate and inanimate, are inclined toward their proper ends in virtue of
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being created as the kinds of things they are. Anticipating a formulation of Josef Pieper,
one can say that all natural kinds are “shot” arrow-like toward their respective ends.
Amor or love, then, is found analogously throughout creation, in things inanimate, such
as rocks replicas, and in things animate, such as apples and antelopes, and even angels
and man himself.
In some respects, then, the human person is like the rest of creation. “[O]ne who
comprehends man to the depths of his soul as creatura,” Josef Pieper explains,

simultaneously knows that in the act of being created we are – without
being asked and without even the possibility of being asked – shot toward
our destination. Therefore, a kind of gravitational impulse governs our
desire for happiness. Nor can we have any power over this impulse
because we ourselves are it.49

Even so, the human person stands apart in creation. While all different kinds of
creatures share analogously in the function of being internally directed to their own
fulfillment, at the apex of all the levels of appetite there stands the human will. “Thomas
posits that the will’s most fundamental inclination, its natural inclination, is toward
beatitude, the fulfillment or perfection of the rational being in which it is found.”50 The

49
50

Pieper, 235.
Id.

17

will of the human person is free but motored by an appetite toward that individual
person’s fulfillment or happiness.51
All of this has profound consequences for how we understand love. On the one
hand, our created, unchosen natural desire for happiness is itself a love of self.
According to Thomas, “Love is an appetitive activity, and, in fact, the most basic of all
such activities.”52 Love in this sense is person’s intrinsic inclination toward his or her
perfection. “It is not surprising, then, to find Thomas saying that the object of love is
always one’s own good.”53 In Thomas’s own words: “Angels like men by nature strive
for their own good and their own perfection; and this means loving themselves.”54
On the other hand, Thomas distinguishes terminologically and conceptually
between the love all created kinds have for their ends and the additional form of love of
which only rational creatures, possessed of will (which brute animals do not possess), are
capable. He calls the latter dilectio, and this is a love over which the rational person has a
choice. It falls to her to decide to love or not to love in this way.
To elaborate the point, at the level of sense appetite, a person will be inclined
toward goods according as they present delight at the level of sense. At the level of
rational appetite, by contrast, the person can pursue these only under the aspect of the
good; that is, at the rational level she can pursue them only if she judges them to be good.
So, at the sensible level I am attracted to a second ribeye; at the rational level I can
pursue the second steak only if I can judge it to be good for me. In sum, dilectio
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“consists in a complacency in the known, good object, and it gives rise to the desire
[either] to be united to the loved object or to the joy one takes in the object if united to
it.”55
Finally, Thomas distinguishes two kinds of dilectio, and with this we come to the
first chamber of the heart of the matter. In his treatment of the passions in the Summa
theologiae, Thomas raises the question whether love is suitably divided between love of
friendship and love of concupiscence, and he replies as follows:

I answer that as the philosopher says in Rhetoric Bk. II, “to love is to will
the good for someone.” In this way, then, the motion of love tends toward
two things: namely towards some good which someone wills for someone,
either for one’s self or for another; and toward that [person] for which one
wills that good. Thus one loves the good that one is willing for the other
with love of concupiscence, and one loves that [person] for which the
good is willed with a love of friendship.56

The form of love that is dilectio, then, is directed, first, to a person, and this is what
Thomas calls love of friendship (amor amicitiae), and second, to the good(s) for that
person, which Thomas calls love of concupiscence (amor concupiscentiae).
To be clear, the form of dilectio that is love of friendship, i.e., amor amicitiae, is
not limited to what we commonly refer to in English as “friendship.” Rather, “[t]he term
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denotes simply the love of a person, by which one has complaisance in the other person
as good in himself and consequently wills goods for that person for that person’s sake.”57
As Pieper explains, in this sort of love the lover says, “It’s good that you exist.”58
Sometimes the lover says this to other subsistent beings, but, as Pieper muses, “To whom
do we refer that expression, instantly and with sincerity, if not to ourselves?”59 And it is
on the basis of this prior loving affirmation that we will then proceed to love with a love
of concupiscence what is good for us.
Amor amicitiae is the higher form of love of dilection, because here what is loved
is loved for its own sake. The complacency of the good of friendship is an affirmation of
the good that is found in the self (or, as we will see, in another) as good in itself. Again:
“It is good that you exist.” As one commentator explains, “[t]he love of concupiscence
is, so to speak, derivative, and the good found in its objects is loved as the good of the
person to whom they are referred.”60 This rank ordering reflects the fact that, for
Thomas, only subsisting beings, not their perfections or accidents, can be loved for their
own sake.61
In sum, we can return to our starting point in the natural desire, which each person
has, for happiness. What we can say is that every rational person loves himself with a
love of friendship, that is, as a subsisting person. We can also say, derivatively, that every
rational person loves with a love of concupiscence the goods necessary or desirable for
his own happiness or fulfillment. In every act of willing, including the willing that is
57
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loving, the individual seeks his or her own perfection, that is, his own good. Happiness,
whether considered as general formality (bonum in communi) or as a specific
instantiation (bonum suum), can only be loved with a love of concupiscence, because
happiness is the perfection of a subsisting being, not a subsisting being itself.

V. Beginning with Self-Love

Though it may come as a surprise to them, all this has much to teach Victor and
Otto. I begin with Victor regarding Victor, not Victor regarding Otto. Before Victor can
respond appropriately to Otto, he must take himself in hand. Victor is on a sad slide from
virtue into vice on account of Otto’s deliberately deciding to take Victor down a peg or
two. Before being offended by Otto, Victor was (we will assume) well-disposed toward
both himself and the world, a man of virtue. Victor has now become an angry and
resentful person. This cannot continue except at the cost of Victor’s self-destruction.
Victor’s natural inclination toward his own happiness and the virtues that make it
possible (e.g., temperance, fortitude, courage, and such) must, through Victor’s exercise
of his own freedom (no one can or will do it for him), manifest itself afresh in the two
aspects of dilectio. Out of love of friendship for himself, Victor is now called to say to
himself: “It is good that you exist.” Victor is further called to love with a love of
concupiscence the perfections that are proper to him. In sum, out of proper love of
himself, Victor must seek to return from an incipiently vicious state to a virtuous state.
Many accounts of forgiveness condition the act of forgiving on the apology,
repentance, or contrition of the victimizer – and often one can sympathize with the
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reasons that coalesce around victims not making doormats of themselves. The account of
forgiveness I am developing here necessarily excludes the possibility of making
forgiveness conditional. Why? Because forgiveness begins in – and unless impeded
grows out of -- the act of self-love, and each person’s call to love of self is unconditional.
We are shot through with an arrow toward our own happiness, and there is no
conceivable reason not to love oneself, because to love oneself just is to affirm that one is
good (and in need of the perfections of virtue that constitute natural happiness). None of
us is a doormat – pace the prevalent theories that are agnostic as to the goodness of being.
Each of us is good inasmuch as we exist – and each is called to perfection of virtue in
charity. To be sure, collateral attacks, such as Otto’s, sting; to be sure, as long as Otto
the offender does not apologize, repent, or have contrition, he (Otto) will still be in a bad
way. This failure on the part of the offender, however, is no reason for the victim not to
begin to do what is necessary for himself, as Herbert McCabe explains:

We can forgive our enemies even though they do not apologize and are
not contrite. . . . In such forgiveness we are changed, we change from
being vengeful to being forgiving, but our enemy does not change. . . .
The expression of our forgiveness may just be something we say to
ourselves which our enemies do not know about or care about and which
does nothing for them. Such forgiveness is good for us; it blesses him that
gives, even though not him that takes.62

62

Herbert McCabe, God, Christ, and Us (London: Continuum, 1996), 122.

22

Our proper love of self requires that we give up those vicious emotions of hatred and
resentment of another person that are not good for us. Perhaps even before we think selfconsciously of how to change vis-à-vis our injurer, we should be thinking of changing
ourselves. Without that change, on which our own happiness depends, none will be
possible toward the offender. Before we can will our offender’s good, we must will our
own – as I go on to explain in what follows.

VI. From Self-Love to Love of Another Self

But enough about Victor’s self-love, in which he has begun to overcome hatred of
Otto. This is not yet forgiveness. How does this first love which I have been describing
finally become forgiveness, that is, the love of an offender such as Otto? Thomas does
not teach that we never love others for their own sake; he does not teach that we “love”
others only instrumentally to our own goods. On the contrary, Thomas teaches that
persons do – and should – love others for the others’ sake, that is, with what we often call
a “disinterested” love. But how is this is possible? How is it possible both that the object
of love is always one’s own good and that we love other persons for their own sake?
With this we come to the second chamber of the heart of the matter, and the focus here is
on similarity in terms of natural kind and, consequently, of goods.
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Thomas teaches the priority of self-love, but he does so without sinking into
egoism.63 This is possible because, according to Thomas, our judgment of our unity with
others based on likeness leads us to love those others with a love of friendship. In his
discussion of the causes of love in the Summa theologiae, Thomas explains:

The first kind of likeness causes love of friendship or benevolence. For
from the fact that two things are alike, having as it were one form, they are
in a certain manner one in that form, as two men are one in the species of
humanity and two white persons in whiteness. And therefore the affection
of the one inclines toward the other as toward what is one with himself: he
wills the good for him as he does for himself.64

In other words, the unity of affections that constitutes love of friendship follows upon the
judgment that there obtains a preexisting unity, the ontological unity of sharing in the
same human form.65 As a result of this judgment, “a person is moved,” first, “to take the
other person at the level of affection as another self and,” second, “so to desire and seek,”
with a love of concupiscence, “that person’s good.”66 The love of friendship for another,
the first act, leads to the second act, love of concupiscence for his or her goods.
As to the first, it should be stressed that, if a person were blind to his own
goodness, he would be blind to the goodness of others. If a person found nothing lovable
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in himself, he would not be able to love others.67 Love of another self depends upon love
of self. “The love that a man has for others arises in man,” Thomas explains,

from the love that he has for himself, for a man stands in relation to a
friend as he does to himself. But a person loves himself inasmuch as he
wishes the good for himself, just as he loves another person by wishing
him good. So, by the fact that one is interested in his own good he is led
to develop an interest in another person’s good.68

The extension of self-love to include another occurs when we see that other person as
another self, loved for who she is.69 To quote and then extend what we first said of
ourselves: “It is good that you exist! You are not the same person that I am but you are
good, and it is good (for me) that you exist!”70 In the love of friendship for another, “I
take the other person as somehow good in himself or herself, and for this reason as a
good for me. The affective extension of self can only be that, an extension, if the
goodness of the other is not reduced to my goodness, as occurs in [love of desire], but
rather is a good other than the good I have in my own individual subsisting self.”71
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The priority of self-love that I am reporting from Thomas is not a not-so-covert
assertion of the ontological superiority or priority of the self.72 Quite the opposite.

The

extension of self-love into love of the other follows upon the judgment of similarity and
unity in form. Unless we fail to reach that judgment, we will take the victimizer as
another self and will with a love of concupiscence what is good for him. The self that
loves itself with a love of friendship and humans as other selves will be moved to love
those others with a love of friendship, and following upon that a love of concupiscence
for those others’ true goods.73 The love of self “find[s] its fulfillment precisely in the
love of others.”74
In sum, where conventional analyses would raise the question of whether, and if
so under what conditions (if any), Victor should forgive Otto, the stage has been set for
me to say that Victor should posthaste – and necessarily first – love himself, and then
allow that self-love to extend itself into a love for Otto, first a love of friendship and then,
derivative of it, a love of concupiscence. This latter love will be the desire for Otto to
give up his vicious envy (of Victor) and return to a state of virtue. Though it starts in
self-regard, forgiveness is indeed “other-directed,”75 and it extends not only to the person
but also to what is good for him. The virtuous do not stand in need of human
72

“For Thomas, the primacy of self-love over love of neighbor on this level is not a statement of normative
ethics. He simply describes the natural weight of the human will, which is inscribed in it as an
ontologically fundamental direction. In a specific way, the human will also stands under the fundamental
law of all creaturely being according to which being-one is prior to becoming-one (unitas est potior
unione). The natural assertion of one’s own good precedes the free love that is supposed to reach the
neighbor, just as it already includes the self of the one loving. At any rate, Thomas does not always clearly
distinguish between the natural assertion of one’s own good and the free self-love of virtuous human beings
who follow the ethical order of love. Hence, he has lent plausibility to the misunderstandings of many
modern interpreters who acknowledge in human love only the ‘physical’ tendency to one’s own good and
overlook the analogical levels in which the natural weight of being is realized on the level of human beings
by their free will.” Schockenhoff, 253
73
For some complications to this analysis, see infra text at note <>.
74
Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on Self-Love,” 23.
75
See Harvey, 213: “[W]hatever else we may say about forgiveness, it is ‘other-directed.’”

26

forgiveness. “Forgiving others is always incarnating Goodness and the best one can hope
for in doing well by them.”76

VI. Interpersonal Forgiveness within the Anthropology of Grace

Some of the distinguishing features of the Thomistic account of forgiveness will
come into clearer focus by resolving several contrasts. Roger Scruton has written that
Charles Griswold is right to condition forgiveness on contrition, lest “you have shown no
recognition of the fault.”77 But this is a non sequitur, since the voluntary injustice is the
very reason for the forgivness; again, we don’t need to forgive fallen rocks or seized
epileptics, no matter how much they damage us. The very condition of the possibility of
true forgiveness is the experience of an offense, a willed denial of justice. It is Otto’s
fault that he willed (and perpetrated) an injustice.78 Absent such an offense, there is no
room for forgiveness, no person to be forgiven, and I have already explained why
forgiveness cannot properly be conditional, pace Howard McGary79: Our call to self-love
is not conditional, and self-love extends itself into love of another provided the other is
seen as he in fact is, that is, as another self.80
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But this is by no means to suggest that forgiveness will necessarily be easy. The
literature on forgiveness makes much of the question of the difficulty of forgiving, and
given what we know of the capacity of humans to offend and violate one another, the
issue is gravely serious. Someone might appropriately object that Victor and Otto,
shoves and bicycles distort the matter by trivializing it. Perhaps, but I borrow the
example (with some alteration) from as serious a moralist as Herbert McCabe.81 Still,
there can be no doubt but that the question about whether forgiveness is required – and
therefore possible -- must ultimately be confronted in the face of torturers and rapists,
gulags and concentration camps, perpetrators of apartheid and traffickers of oneself as a
child – offenses that cannot but arouse the fear “[v]ery deep in us . . . that our existence as
a subject is precarious, and contingent, and perhaps an illusion.”82 Those who do us
injustice become, to a greater or lesser extent, enemies of our existence. 83 Is it possible
that the victims of some offenses can be incapable of forgiving their offenders?
For an answer, I must return to the distinction I made at the outset. I
distinguished between two types of love, natural love and supernatural love, and I did so,
as I said, in order, in the end, to reunite them. From the Catholic Christian perspective,
we – all of us humans – first come to the tasks that are ours by nature (including the
primordial one of self-love) always already graced, always already caught up in a
object that “this is an attitude-focused reason for forgiving and we are seeking an object-focused on.
Attitude-focused reasons for action are reasons for getting oneself into a particular psychological state, in
this case the state of having a forgiving attitude. To adopt a forgiving attitude in order to make oneself feel
better is to act on an attitude-focused reason. Object-focused reasons reveal the way in which the
relationship actually holds between the victim and the offender makes a forgiving response appropriate.
Attitude-focused reasons do not . . . .” Id. at 51-52. The objection depends upon a false dilemma.
Forgiving another as a function of loving oneself (and then another self) is not dissolvable into “attitude;” it
remains at the level of virtue, not of “objects” but of persons. Garrard and McNaughton have dark
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supernatural economy in which grace builds on and helps nature -- unless and to the
extent we opt out of sanctifying grace by personal sin. Instructively, one way to “opt
out” would be deliberately to refuse, in a grave matter, to refuse to love one another as
we have been loved. The Thomist’s “anthropology of grace” nowhere provides a reason
for not loving one another as we have been loved by God.
From an opposing perspective that lacks the element of grace altogether but
affirms a purely natural version of the teleological view that I have developed here, one
faces the problem that Bernard Williams called, in a deliberate oxymoron, “moral luck,”
the possibility that by bad luck we will ineluctably end up being morally bad
individuals.84 This, roughly, was Aristotle’s view, that some people’s worldly lot could
be such that they would necessarily be morally bad people. Deploring this feature of
Greek ethics, Jacques Maritain noted an historical alternative: “The great novelty
introduced by Christianity is this appeal to all, to free men and slaves, to the ignorant and
the cultivated, adolescents and old men, a call to perfection which no effort of nature can
obtain but which is given by grace and consists in love, and from which therefore no one
is excluded except by his own refusal. The same is true regarding final Beatitude . . . It
is promised to all, if only they really wish it.”85 Christians do not believe that everyone
will flourish in terms of worldly success (which too often for the Greeks was equated
with or identical to happiness), nor, on the other hand, do Christians believe they are the
only ones God calls to the true happiness that is the love revealed in the New Testament,
and made possible by grace.
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In the context under consideration here, where a person’s happiness has been
disrupted by an offense that has dislodged him from the habitual practice of virtue, which
is the happiness that is possible in this life, the believing Christian can say that it is God
through Christ who makes both possible and exigent the victim’s love of himself and his
consequent forgiveness of his offender. The “anthropology of grace” teaches that love is
possible, and with it – and only with – the complete practice of all of the other virtues.
The Thomist says that love is the form of all of the other virtues, and by this he or she
means that charity orders all the other virtues to the happiness that is possible in this life
and to their ultimate end, the person’s happiness with God.86 We do not have to
exaggerate or falsify the level of our control over our moral emotions, which can be quite
tenuous and elusive, in order to say forthrightly that every rational person, thanks to
grace, is capable of doing what God requires, as Herbert McCabe explains:

All that God asks of us is that we put aside the barriers, the illusions and
the timidity that stand in the way of accepting his love. All that he asks is
that we relax and let ourselves be filled with his love, which eliminates our
sins and makes us channels and bearers of his love and forgiveness to
everyone.87

This occurs by charity’s working in and through the virtues, including those Victor
surrendered, at least in part, when he became angry and resentful at Otto in the wake of
Otto’s offense.
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Without pretending that forgiving will always or even often be easy, the Thomist
teaches that we should recognize that we are called to love ourselves in a way that allows
God’s love to work through us and thus to reach others. Sometimes we will be able to
resume relations with our enemies, sometimes not.88 Regardless, forgiveness – the love
of one who has offended us – will be complete when we have sincerely willed his or
good as much as it is in us to will it.89 It is these acts – of love of friendship and of
concupiscence, first of oneself and then of one’s injurer – that constitute the necessary
and sufficient conditions of forgiveness.90 If reconciliation requires atonement for
injustice, human forgiveness refuses to be held hostage by justice and the contingency of
its satisfaction.
This is reinforced in the fine work of Gaelle Fiasse, which has helpfully clarified
that forgiveness per se is an interior act on the part of the victim,91 a denunciation of the
offense and an affirmation of the offender (but not qua offender).92 The essential
interiority of forgiveness does not rule out its sometimes or even frequently being
accompanied by exterior manifestations, including declarations (which are not
themselves performative – declarations are sometimes false).93 But whereas love of

88

This question involves a determination of the virtue of prudence. See Summa theologiae, II-II 47.7.
Cf. Pieper, 196-98.
90
On such affirming/willing, see Pieper, 164-65.
91
“Forgiveness and the Refusal of Injustice,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American
Catholic Philosophical Association, October 31, 2008. I should add that Fiasse distinguishes “integral
forgiveness” which does involve and external exchange between offender and victim, “freely offered and
received.”
92
See also North, 500: “[F]ar from removing the fact of wrongdoing, forgiveness actually relies upon the
recognition of this fact for its very possibility.” Unfortunately, North then proceeds to conflate forgiveness
and reconciliation. See id. at 505-06. John Wilson takes North to task for not requiring repentance as a
part of this forgiveness-cum-reconciliation. John Wilson, “Why Forgiveness Requires Repentance,” 63
Philosophy 534 (1988).
93
“We can forgive our enemies even though they do not apologize and are not contrite. But such
forgiveness, as I have said, does not help them, does not re-create them. In such forgiveness we are
changed, we change from being vengeful to being forgiving, but our enemy does not change. . . . The
expression of our forgiveness may just be something we say to ourselves which our enemies do not know
89

31

concupiscence desires to bring about the good of another, the prior love of friendship
seeks a true union between the lover and the loved, which is interior.94 Such a union is
not a spontaneous or secure achievement, even on a good day. If the forgiven continues
to offend the victim, this does not diminish – indeed, it may magnify -- the victim’s need
to love himself and, by extension, his offender. The more (apparently!) wicked the
offender, the greater potential difficulty for the victim to see him or her as another self.
Still, our injurers, however wicked, share with us not only our human nature, as I have
mentioned repeatedly, but also the call of all humans to supernatural happiness95 -- and
this is the complete ontological basis for the elongation of self-love into forgiveness.
It is worth belaboring that the movement from self-love to love of another is
fraught with risk of failure! Such is the working of the human mind and heart that our
own sinfulness can preempt the recognition of unity on which love of our enemies
depends. The history of human speculation about equality and inequality is replete with
evidence that the judgment of unity in human kind is far from assured.96 Especially
dangerous are our own imaginings that we know the names of those who will not be
saved. There is no theological contradiction lurking here. Catholics do indeed profess
that God calls all to salvation, but they also profess that God’s antecedent will that all be
saved does not preclude God’s consequent will to damn those who sin and do not
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repent.97 But who are the condemned? As far as we know, all our fellow humans share
our nature and the same vocation to beatitude.
None of this is to deny that we love more and more easily those who are more
similar to us. The facts that are knowable by us are not overlooked, as Aquinas makes
clear: “[J]ust as fire acts with greater force on what is near than on what is distant, so
too, charity loves with greater fervor those who are united to us than those who are far
removed; and in this respect the love of friends, considered in itself, is more ardent and
better than love of one’s enemy.”98 Even this, though, cannot become a resting place,
according to Aquinas, for faith leads to hope, and hope leads to charity. We must hope
that our enemy will come to his senses, love himself, and, in turn, love us and, above all,
God.99

VII. Conclusion

The account of interpersonal forgiveness that I have sketched here has the
advantage, I submit, that, without slighting the other-directed character of forgiveness, it
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returns attention to the offended and the moral imperative of her returning from vice to
virtue. Such a virtue-theoretic account of natural forgiveness would have its own value
even if what I have said about grace were not true, because the admitted appropriateness
of the “moral emotions,” with which we began, settles neither the question of the kind of
people we capable of being nor the question of the kind of people we should be. As to
the second, to suggest that an enemy’s collateral attack should render me an angry
person, full stop, is to deny that we have a natural inclination to a happiness that is fitting
for our kind, an end that we should achieve. Such denials of natural teleology are, as I
noted, common. But they leave open the former question, of what kind of people we are
capable of being. Are the offended, even the grievously offended, capable of self-love
and love of others? What appears to be an empirical question calls for an empirical
answer.
For the Christian, the empirical is not exhaustive. For the Christian, the dyadic
relationship between offender and offended is always already in fact part of a triadic
relation that includes God and the possibility that offense against our fellow man involves
sin, first on the part of the offender, but also on the part of the offended if he refuses to
love himself and then his offender. Every sin – every culpable injustice -- is an offense
against God, which only He can forgive, whether it be Otto’s or Victor’s. This is exactly
why Victor’s hating Otto’s offense was morally commendable: “That person who is
angry at his brother’s sin does not seek his own vengeance but God’s, for sin is nothing
else but an offense against God, and therefore he who is justly angry does not usurp what
belongs to God.”100
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It would be a usurpation, however, to refuse to forgive our offenders, because
forgiveness is not, strictly speaking, our own, but God’s. As Timothy Jackson explains,
“[w]e do not forgive others in order subsequently to be forgiven, but rather because we
have already been forgiven, most basically by God. . . . Once we comprehend
forgiveness as Eternity’s work of love, as a good gift given first from above,”101 we are
free to get on with this life’s work, which Henri Nouwen described in this way: “We
need to forgive and be forgiven, every day, every hour – unceasingly. That is the great
work of love among the fellowship of the weak that is the human family.”102 Such work
does not condone the offense; it responds to persons with love exactly because we have
been loved first through a gracious participation in the divine life. Again, love in the
form of forgiveness does not overlook (indeed, it depends upon) the offense, but it rejects
the views of those who maintain either that we sometimes do well to try to hold ourselves
and our dignity together through a protective grudge-bearing toward our offender103 or
that we should calculate and tabulate the reasons to forgive.104 If we have reason to
forgive, it is the “reason” that is grace.105 It is we who freely love our enemies, but it is
not we who make it possible. “Divine generosity meets the creature’s efforts [to forgive
as completely as God forgives] with miraculous aid, enabling the victim to forgive. And
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so, at bottom, forgiveness is . . . a gift bestowed on victim and offender alike, a beautiful
aspect of human life, a sign of a benign universe – Christians would say, an
advertisement of its gracious maker.”106
Is this too much to believe? If we doubt the gracious character of all interpersonal
forgiveness, it would be paradoxical or even perverse if we were to entertain no doubt
about whether we are entitled to be angry or resentful at an apparent offense. Not being
able to read others’ hearts, are we sure they offended us?107 An offense depends upon a
culpable violation of justice, not just my perhaps eccentric or precious sensibility that I
have been mistreated. Are we ourselves sure we are not too sensitive, sure that we are
not too quick to find fault (culpa) where there is none?108 God only knows.
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